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Introduction
The treatment of terrorist suspects in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 has raised challenging questions concerning the responsibility of States for participation in the internationally wrongful acts of others. Secondly, the claims that complicity by omission is possible only where the complicit action also violates a pre-existing positive obligation will be examined. The existence of a positive obligation may increase the moral culpability of the inaction, but given that complicity through omission may fail to meet the material, not subjective element, how can positive obligations provide the necessary cure for this causative deficiency? Additionally, there are many conceptual differences between positive obligations and complicity by omission, but if the former are necessary to facilitate responsibility for the latter, are the two concepts in danger of merging?
Thirdly, this article will seek to take the rationale of complicity one step further, and speculate on the possibility of complicity by a different form of passivity: by omission in the absence of a positive obligation, or 'inaction'. 'Omission' assumes a prior duty to act, and that the State, by not acting, has failed in this obligation; "a doing contrary to a norm is a commission, a non-doing is an omission". 12 'Inaction', conversely, is a neutral term, which does not presuppose a legal obligation to act. 'Complicity by inaction' could engage responsibility where the would-be complicit State's inaction is lawful per se, but engages responsibility where this inaction contributes to an internationally wrongful act. Though seemingly controversial, this should be the aim of a functional derivative responsibility regime. Throughout the examination of the concept of complicity by omission, reference will be made to the fictional scenario, provided below:
State X plans to carry out an attack against State Z in violation of Article 2(4) UN Charter.
13
State Y is a State geographically located between X and Z. Consider these three alternative scenarios:
a) In order to carry out this attack, X's planes must refuel in Y. Y, knowing of X's purposes, grants permission for X's planes to refuel en route to attacking Z. X attacks Z.
b) In order to carry out the attack, X must fly through the airspace of Y. Y has ratified a treaty establishing a common security and defence policy with Z providing, inter alia, that Y will work to prevent attacks on Z. Y is aware of X's purposes and does not object to X using Y's airspace. X attacks Z.
c) In order to carry out the attack, X must fly through the airspace of Y. Y is aware of X's purposes but does not object to X using Y's airspace. X attacks Z.
These scenarios correspond to complicity by action, complicity by omission, and complicity by inaction, respectively. Drawing upon the prior discussion, this article will assess State Y's responsibility for complicity under Article 16; providing a vivid demonstration of the distinctive, yet complementary natures of complicity by omission, complicity by inaction, and positive obligations in international law. Ultimately, this article submits that complicity should impose responsibility in all three scenarios.
Complicity

History of the Concept in International Law
Complicity concerns the wrongfulness of contributing to the wrongful act of another; it is recognised in criminal law regimes, finding expression in the prohibition of aid and assistance.
14 13 This scenario is employed solely to demonstrate the mechanics of the law of State responsibility, and thus it shall be assumed that this attack results in the commission of an internationally wrongful act in violation of Article 2(4) UN Charter. Related use of force issues and controversies in the Charter rules on the use of force will not be addressed in this paper.
14 M. Jackson, Complicity in International Law, (Oxford, OUP, 2015) pp. 10 -11.
It is derivative in the sense that the wrongfulness of the actions of the assister is derived from the wrongfulness of the actions of the principal, 15 though various legal systems offer distinctive conceptualisations of this relationship. Common law systems tend to view complicity as imputational, with the result that the assister is treated as having committed the act of the principal. 16 Civil law systems, by contrast, view complicity as non-imputational -the acts of complicity are penalised as exactly that -acts of complicity in the wrongful act of another. This latter model reflects the approach of Article 16 ASR. 17 Complicity notes the effect that States are able to have on the commission of internationally wrongful acts by others, and enforces the axiom that "I am responsible for my actions", recognising that "my own actions inevitably include my actions of contributing to your actions". 18 Thus, the concept acknowledges assistance as indirect causal contributions to the harm caused by the principal.
Article 16 ASR
There was a certain unease surrounding complicity in the early drafts of the ASR; though contained in Article 25, it was seen to represent progressive development, rather than codification of the law. 19 This is somewhat surprising given that the concept had, in essence, received judicial attention nearly 30 years previous in the Corfu Channel case. 20 Though recently 15 Various terms are employed to refer to the roles, including secondary and primary, accessory and principal, accessory and perpetrator. This paper shall use 'assister' and 'principal'. of the Definition of Aggression, and will limit itself to consideration of Article 16.
In a sense, these specific complicity regimes partially detract from the utility of a secondary rule of general application, as the specific rules concern the same conduct and circumvent "the deficiencies which are attached to Article 16". 37 It is worth noting, however, that despite the existence of these specific provisions Article 16 remains a valuable rule, offering a 'baseline' prohibition of assistance that maintains significance due its universal norm coverage and the relative paucity of specific provisions in other areas. 
Omissions in Article 16
This section will examine whether Article 16 excludes the possibility of complicity by omission.
In doing so it shall consider whether omissions are necessarily incapable of satisfying any of the constituent parts of Article 16, but first it is necessary to delineate the meaning of 'omission'.
Omissions Liability
Liability for a failure to act can arise under the guise of different legal concepts, and certain types of liability often deceptively appear as omissions. between complicity and responsibility arising from omissions had been discussed by the ILC during the drafting process, so the issue could not have been beyond their contemplation. 41 The ICJ has interpreted complicity as necessarily involving positive acts, holding that: "complicity always requires that some positive action is taken … while complicity results from commission, violation of the obligation to prevent results from omission". 42 Whilst the robustness of this determination is beyond dispute, its relevance to Article 16 is questionable. In Bosnia, the Court was primarily engaged in interpreting the Genocide Convention, and even if it was interpreting Article 16, it did so having transposed the exclusion of complicit omissions from the complicity provision in the Genocide Convention. 43 Thus, this limitation may not apply at all to Article 16, 44 and without a definitive pronouncement on the potential for complicity by omission, consideration of an omission's theoretical capacity to satisfy the requirements of Article 16 is necessary.
Article 16 is commonly seen as consisting of three parts: the material element, the subjective element, and the opposability requirement. 45 The material element is concerned with the types of acts that may constitute complicity; the subjective element refers to the requisite mental state of the assister; and the opposability rule requires that the norm violated was also owed by the assister.
2.3
The Material Element alternatively: the conduct element, the nexus between the assistance and the principal's wrong, the fault of the assister, and the double obligation requirement. Jackson, supra note 14, at p. 153.
Throughout the drafting process of complicity, the aid or assistance was primarily defined by reference to its link to the wrongful act, rather than the inherent character of the assistance. 46 It appears that "all kinds of aid and assistance fall within the rule", and that the key question is "what is the required relationship between the aid and assistance, and the wrongful act of the assisted State?" 47 Adopting what is essentially a causality-based test, the ILC provides only the briefest of guidance, stating that the assistance need not be "essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act". 48 The
absence of a quality-based limitation suggests that even the most minimal conduct would be sufficient so long as it contributed significantly to the wrongful act. 49 Thus, the provision of food supplies for humanitarian purposes cannot amount to complicity in a use of force. 50 Here then, one may note the introduction into international law of a problem with which domestic systems, as well as international criminal law, have grappled, namely, whether omissions count as causes. 51 It is this causation issue that is decisive in assessing whether complicity by omission is possible.
Passivity and Causation
If omissions can count as causes, then they are capable of constituting the material element of complicity. In addition to the other legal regimes that have confronted this challenging issue, much has been written on this topic in theoretical and philosophical terms. distinguished from action, and as a result, been characterised as absent causal consequences; on this view, they are "merely the absence of a preventive anti-cause". 56 Other authors have focused on this issue in moral terms; opining that "the moment we realize that harm to human beings could be prevented, we are entitled to see the failure to prevent it as a cause". 57 In the context of Article 16, this approach would see a widening of the material element, and a utilisation of the subjective element as a limiting factor. But subjective elements have their own unique issues in international law, and this approach could therefore be said to be unworkable. 58 In sum, the scholarship in this area does not provide a definitive answer.
Legal Treatment of Passivity as Assistance
This section will consider the treatment of passivity in law in order to discover whether other regimes accept passivity as a form of action. 59 Whilst it appears that it will be difficult for an omission to meet the causation requirement, it is increasingly recognised that omissions are not excluded from satisfying the material element of Article 16.
The Subjective Element
Though the text of Article 16 only requires that the assisting State assists with "knowledge of the circumstances", the Commentary seems to impose an intent requirement, stating that the assistance "must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, and must actually do so". 66 This appears to be in conflict with a later comment that, unless the primary complicity by omission can occur in Scenario B but not in Scenario C. Though the (in-)action is the same, the presence of a positive obligation to prevent, incumbent on State Y, means that responsibility for complicity by omission will arise in addition to responsibility flowing from the breach of the positive obligation.
Can Positive Obligations Facilitate Complicity by Omission?
The view that positive obligations are necessary to facilitate complicity by omission may appear justified where the two responsibilities are engaged by the same act. However, a slight nuance illustrates the merely technical importance of the co-incidence. The positive obligation need not concern the same content as the primary norm violated; the omission simply needs to be causally connected to the violation. In situations where the primary norm and the positive obligation relate to different content, it is unclear why there is a requirement of a breach of an obligation. If the violation of positive obligations is a necessary precondition to complicity in such situations, then the law provides either an absence or a duality of responsibility. Either no primary violation occurred, in which case there can also be no complicity; or there was a primary violation, in which case there may also be complicity by omission. When a positive obligation is violated, responsibility for complicity by omission will accompany the responsibility flowing from the primary violation where the subjective and opposability requirements are met. This seems to reduce the role of complicity somewhat; it is still ancillary, but is more closely linked to the assister's wrongful omission than the principal's wrongful act.
3.2.2
Can Positive Obligations Address the Causation Issue?
As noted above, the objective element of Article 16 is causation-based. 86 In the context of ongoing uncertainty as to whether omissions can truly have causes, it appears that there will be significant difficulty in showing that omissions can constitute complicity. Some authors and legal regimes seem to suggest that the causative issue concerning omissions is circumvented when a positive obligation is breached. On this view, omissions have consequences where there was a prior obligation to act; where "there is a duty to do something and you do nothing, your 'doing nothing' counts as a cause". 87 If this is so, it provides strong support for the concept of complicity by omission; the view that positive obligations facilitate complicity by omission would aid the leaping of the causative hurdle that the objective element presents. But, it is submitted, this assessment misunderstands or ignores the distinct nature of these two responsibilities, and is based on a "confusion between issues of 'causation' on the one hand and issues of 'duty' on the other". 88 There is, in fact, no material difference in the causative value of the omission in Scenario B and the inaction in Scenario C. Accordingly, the better view is that a "legal duty cannot transform an omission from a nothing that can cause nothing, to a nothing that If positive obligations do in some way address the causation-omissions issue, then perhaps this is because their presence is indicative of the capacity to influence a situation, and allows a failure to act to be seen as the factual cause of a harm. 90 Depending on the interpretation of the subjective element of Article 16, capacity to influence may be an important determination in whether an omission or inaction is sufficient to invoke complicity. 91 If the subjective requirement is modified by the primary norm violated, then this will be the case. 92 Ordinarily, however, the standard for violation of positive obligations, not complicity, will be capacity to influence. 93 In any event, there is no reason why that issue cannot be addressed directly, thus eschewing the unnecessary evidential detour through positive obligations.
Does a Breach of Positive Obligations Increase Culpability?
Another way in which it has been suggested that positive obligations justify the imposition of responsibility for complicity is that a failure to act, which breaches an obligation, is highly In order to invoke complicity under Article 16, the primary wrong needs to actually occur. With conflicting jurisprudence on the matter, it is not clear that this is the case for positive obligations.
In Tehran, it was held that the "inaction of the Iranian Government by itself constituted clear and serious violation of Iran's obligations". 114 But, later, in interpreting the positive obligations emanating from the Genocide Convention, the ICJ held that "a State can be held responsibility for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually committed". 115 Again, as was previously suggested, it is not clear whether this determination is confined to those positive obligations arising out of the Genocide Convention. For complicity, conversely, the position is clear: the wrongful act of the principal must actually occur. 
Due Diligence Requires the Exercise of Control
Due diligence obligations appear to require a level of control that is not required for complicity. 117 This has frequently found manifestation in the territorial limitation of positive obligations of prevention. Accordingly, in Corfu Channel Albania violated its positive obligations because the act occurred on its territory, and was therefore treated as an act over which Albania exercised effective control. This requirement is not always strictly tethered to territory, however. In Cyprus v. Turkey, the ECtHR found that Turkey controlled and supported the Turkish Cypriot administration in Northern Cyprus without that administration being on Turkish territory. 118 There is no requirement that there was effective control over another State for the imposition of responsibility for complicity. Such control is more akin to the test for direct attribution under Article 8 ASR, as per the ICJ decision in Nicaragua. 119 Despite the difficulty of discerning the contours of the subjective element of Article 16, it is clear that generally, the two concepts will impose different standards of behaviour; "'capacity to influence effectively' now emerges as an applicable standard for the obligation to prevent, whereas complicity requires 'full knowledge of facts'". 120 The result is a much lower threshold for due diligence obligations, which imposes responsibility "upon constructive knowledge or risk that the breach will occur". 121 One of the primary targets for the academic criticism of Article 16 has been the subjective element. 122 Much of this criticism has centred on the difficulty of proving that a State possessed a certain state of mind; it will be challenging to determine whether a State really intended to facilitate an internationally wrongful act. In this sense, the constructive knowledge aspect of positive obligations provides a significant advantage; it will be much easier to show that there has been a violation of a positive obligation.
Positive Obligations are Vague Concepts
Complicity is a more rigid notion, which in some instances can be difficult to prove. Positive obligations, on the other hand, allow for consideration of policy questions that would not be relevant in assessing whether there is responsibility under Article 16. 123 In this sense, positive obligations can be seen as a useful residual method, allowing courts the latitude to establish responsibility "if they consider the result of a negative finding on responsibility to be unjust in other regards". 124 This view confirms that, whilst positive obligations may refer to the same conduct, they can facilitate a much more fluid assessment.
The Usefulness of Complicity
Some of the differences between complicity and positive obligations outlined above demonstrate the continued usefulness of complicity. obligation under the common security and defence policy, in addition to incurring responsibility for complicity in the internationally wrongful act of X. This passivity is an omission -it is a nondoing contrary to the law -and thus it is capable of constituting aid and assistance under Article 16. 131 In Scenario C, there is no positive act which could fall within a traditional understanding of complicity, and no positive obligation was breached. However, it is submitted that there is no causative difference between the inaction in Scenario C and the omission in Scenario B; upon the application of a 'but for' causality test, the passivity in both situations has the same causative effect. Thus, if omissions are accepted as being capable of satisfying the requirements of Article 16, the same must be said of inactions. 130 Hakimi, supra note 93, p. 366. 131 Aust, supra note 1, pp. 225-230.
The distinction between the three situations is not as large as it first appears. An acceptance of responsibility in Scenario A but not Scenario C would allow a recasting of the facts for the avoidance of responsibility. Rather than positively grant the use of territory (action), States can justify that which would otherwise be aid and assistance by knowingly failing to object to the use of their territory (inaction). 132 and that consequently international law should impose responsibility for complicit inactions.
This claim finds support in the fact that inaction is able to meet the criteria set out in Article 16, it may be culpable, it is similar to pre-existing concepts, and features in State practice on aid and assistance.
The Wrongfulness of Inaction
To claim that inaction, as opposed to action or omission, is never wrongful, is akin to claiming that actions which themselves are not internationally wrongful acts are never wrongful. But this is precisely the function of derivative responsibility. The sale of weapons is not in and of itself an internationally wrongful act, but the consequences of this act (the contribution to an internationally wrongful act), combined with the subjective and opposability requirements, furnish the act with a character of wrongfulness. Therefore, on this basis, there cannot be a rejection of culpable inactions in the law of international responsibility, a priori. In this regard it is important to again note the central assumption and ethos of derivative responsibility under Article 16; namely, that "responsibility is ascribed for behaviour which is not per se unlawful". 134 Indeed, draft Article 25 stated explicitly that: "the conduct in question (the because it breaches a primary norm, but because of the contribution it makes to the breach of a primary norm by the State receiving the assistance.
As established above, the role of fault in the law of State responsibility is, notwithstanding, a rather uncertain ground upon which to found or dismiss the possibility of responsibility. 136 In any event, it is not immediately clear that inaction is never culpable. Culpability, it seems to the present author, must be assessed with reference to the subjective element. 145 This final ground is not based on a special relationship, a prior wrongful act by that defendant, or positive obligations, but is imposed due to the fact that the defendant could have prevented the harm, and chose not to.
Thus, though complicity by inaction, as a derivative form of responsibility, is conceptually distinct from these primary rules, there is limited common ground between the two in the rationale employed, and conduit through which responsibility is imposed.
State Practice
Perhaps the most compelling argument for the recognition of complicity by inaction lies in the claims of States themselves. On numerous occasions States have noted the damage that can be caused by inaction, as opposed to omission (which in itself is wrongful). Returning to the opening example, State reactions to the treatment of terrorist suspects in the aftermath of the 11 By establishing that the concept does not offend the constitutive elements of complicity in the ASR, this article has demonstrated the potential for responsibility for complicity by omission. It has shown how complicity by omission can and should be seen a concept distinct from breach of positive obligations of prevention, and taking this reasoning one step further has speculated on the possibility of complicity by inaction.
Culpable passivity, as well as activity, should be fully included within the law of State responsibility. Such inclusion would enhance the doctrinal coherence, and ensure that conduct that facilitates a wrongful act is treated as such, without the need for recourse to the 'consolation prize' of positive obligations. The limited recognition of contributions to the maltreatment of terrorist suspects post 11 September 2001 is but a start to the creation of a cohesive derivative responsibility regime that can fully reconcile the disparities in moral and legal culpability.
Though international law prohibits complicity by commission and by omission, it fails to acknowledge those situations where "through one's inaction one decisively contributes to the creation of conditions that enable (a wrongful act)". 152 To reduce and nullify the reprehensible effects of unchecked State coordination, and to encourage respect for the international rule of law, complicity must evolve further. In doing so it must recognise the manner in which States function in varying degrees of cohesion, moving beyond a mere recognition of active complicity.
As Article 16 in its current interpretation is unfit for this purpose, the resort to vague and illsuited positive obligations is unsurprising. This is lamentable, as such a function should not be, and need not be, beyond the purview of the law of State responsibility.
152 Cassese, supra note 125.
